Knowledge value added as a methodology to evaluate the Office of Force Transformation's Wolf-PAC / Stiletto program concepts by Carter, Timothy R.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
Theses and Dissertations Thesis Collection
2006-09
Knowledge value added as a methodology to
evaluate the Office of Force Transformation's
Wolf-PAC / Stiletto program concepts
Carter, Timothy R.
Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/2557










Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited  
KNOWLEDGE VALUE ADDED AS A METHODOLOGY TO 
EVALUATE THE OFFICE OF FORCE TRANSFORMATION’S 




Michael M. Pitts 




 Thesis Advisor: Thomas J. Housel 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 i
 REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE Form Approved OMB No. 0704-
0188 
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including 
the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, 
and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any 
other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington 
headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 
1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-
0188) Washington DC 20503. 
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank) 
 
2. REPORT DATE   
September 2006 
3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED 
Master’s Thesis 
4. Title and Subtitle Knowledge Value Added as a 
Methodology to Evaluate the Office of Force 
Transformation’s Wolf-PAC / Stiletto Program Concepts  
6. AUTHOR(S)  Michael M. Pitts and Timothy R. Carter 
5. FUNDING NUMBERS 
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA  93943-5000 
8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION 
REPORT NUMBER     
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) 
N/A 
10. SPONSORING/MONITORING 
    AGENCY REPORT NUMBER 
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES  The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not 
reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government. 
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT   
Approved for public release, distribution is unlimited 
12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE 
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words)  
With the DoD acquisition of programs and projects becoming increasingly 
expensive, it is imperative that the method or measure for determining value for a
particular project, real or conceptual, be identified and used enterprise-wide. The form 
of analysis known as the Knowledge Value Added (KVA) methodology, KVA will evaluate the 
Office Force Transformation Wolf-PAC / Stiletto concepts.  This thesis will explore two 
distinctly different areas which demonstrate the KVA method’s use and benefit:      1. 
The use of the KVA method to find improvements in a Command and Control (C2) process,
and 2. To demonstrate the increase value that the Stiletto ship brings to littoral 
operations (i.e., Mine hunting). The resulting values will be compared in varying 
notional scenarios to assess potential improvements for knowledge processes. This method 
of analysis will demonstrate how a reengineered process, resulting from the KVA method,
enables organizations to maximize knowledge creation and production capacity. 
 
15. NUMBER OF 
PAGES  
97 
14. SUBJECT TERMS 
ROI, Return on Investment, ROA, Return on Asset, IT ROI, IT 
Performance, IT Valuation, KVA, Knowledge Value Added   

















NSN 7540-01-280-5500 Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)  






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 iii
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited 
 
 
KNOWLEDGE VALUE ADDED AS A METHODOLOGY TO EVALUATE THE 
OFFICE OF FORCE TRANSFORMATION’S WOLF-PAC / STILETTO PROGRAM 
CONCEPTS 
 
Michael M. Pitts 
Major, United States Marine Corps 
B.S., Hampton University, 1991   
 
Timothy R. Carter 
Lieutenant, United States Navy 
B.S., Norfolk State University, 1999 
 
Submitted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of 
 


























Dan C. Boger 






















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
 v
ABSTRACT 
With the DoD acquisition of programs and projects 
becoming increasingly expensive, it is imperative that the 
method or measure for determining value for a particular 
project, real or conceptual, be identified and used 
enterprise-wide. The form of analysis known as the Knowledge 
Value Added (KVA) methodology, KVA will evaluate the Office 
Force Transformation Wolf-PAC / Stiletto concepts.  This 
thesis will explore two distinctly different areas which 
demonstrate the KVA method’s use and benefit:  
1.  The use of the KVA method to find improvements in 
a Command and Control (C2) process, and  
2.  To demonstrate the increase value that the 
Stiletto ship brings to littoral operations (i.e., 
Mine hunting).  
The resulting values will be compared in varying 
notional scenarios to assess potential improvements for 
knowledge processes. This method of analysis will 
demonstrate how reengineered processes, resulting from the 
KVA method, enable organizations to maximize knowledge 
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A. PURPOSE/PROBLEM STATEMENT 
With the introduction of the strategic document 
“Forward from Sea,” it has been the United States Navy’s 
plan to create a sea-based combat force that can be 
seamlessly integrated into joint and combined military 
operations.  To accomplish this goal the Department of the 
Navy (DoN) spends millions of dollars each year on 
operational research, developmental programs, operational 
platforms and systems. However, it is tremendously 
difficult to assess these developmental programs and 
operational systems, which are designed to maximize the 
flexible and unique combat capabilities in the joint 
warfighting force of today.  This assessment process is 
however important and should emphasize the full value as 
well as cost of warfare capabilities.    
There are several quantitative and qualitative 
indicators that are used to evaluate operational 
activities. Private sector businesses emphasize marketplace 
results over output indicators. This runs contrary to the 
approach espoused by the Department of Defense (DoD).  Much 
of the difference in approach can be explained by a 
difference in orientation; the profit-oriented private 
sector uses net profit as the metric of choice. Therefore, 
many of the indicators used by the private sector 
corporations can not be used effectively by the DoD because 
DoD entities do not measure profit.   
About one third of the DoN funding is spent on 
programs to develop and acquire new capabilities or 
2modernize existing capabilities.1  But without a scalable 
benefit such as profit, it is hard to determine what 
methodology should be used to measure the benefit or 
performance of Navy seabased operational innovations.  
Unlike the private business sector, the DoD has been unable 
to find a suitable methodology to reflect the true return 
on investment (ROI) of its operational programs, platforms 
or systems because they have no proper surrogate for 
revenue.  The DoD should continue to explore new ways to 
quantify the benefits of operational innovations in new or 
existing DoD programs, systems, and platforms in order to 
impose the discipline of the market.  For example, Adam 
Smith’s “Invisible Hand” description conveys the 
motivations behind the free market.  
The system in which the invisible hand is most 
often assumed to work is the free market. Adam 
Smith assumed that consumers choose for the 
lowest price, and that entrepreneurs choose for 
the highest rate of profit. He asserted that by 
thus making their excess or insufficient demand 
known through market prices, consumers "directed" 
entrepreneurs' investment money to the most 
profitable industry.2  
B. COMMAND AND CONTROL 
In general terms within the DoD, “Command and Control 
(C2) is considered the exercise of authority and direction 
by a properly designated commander over assigned and 
attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.”3 C2 
                     
1 Department of the Navy Policy Paper. “…From the Sea” Update, The 
OpNav Assessment Process, May 1993, p. 3 
<http://www.chino.navy.mil/navpalib/policy/fromsea/ftpsuoap.txt> 
(accessed July 14, 2006). 
2 Plus Magazine, issue 14, Adam Smith and the Invisible hand, Helen 
Joyce, March 14, 2006. <http://plus.maths.org/issue14/features/smith/> 
(accessed August 5, 2006). 
3 Defense Technical Information Center.  DoD Dictionary of Military 
and Associated Terms. Joint Publication 1-02. 
3functions are performed through an arrangement of 
personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and 
procedures employed by a commander in planning, directing, 
coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the 
accomplishment of the mission.  Understanding C2 can not be 
considered an option, but should be regarded as a 
requirement in the face of 21st century challenges. As 
technology increases in this information age, our 
approaches to C2 within the military should provide 
significantly increased capabilities and adapt to the 
challenges in this information age.  In recent years the 
Navy has addressed the need to recognize and focus upon the 
new opportunities to improve C2.  The DoN's commitment is 
outlined in the "Naval Transformation Roadmap 2003, Assured 
Access & Power Projection…From the Sea.”  The document 
explains that in this information age “advances in 
technology provide the opportunity to move the 
functionality provided by platforms to the info structure, 
the sensors, or the actor, thus permitting us to decouple 
functions from traditional platforms when necessary.”4     
Currently, the DoD’s Office of Force Transformation 
(OFT) has initiated the operational program known as Wolf 
PAC.  The program's primary goal is to examine the Command 
and Control (C2) operations as they pertain to 
geographically dispersed, networked, autonomous and semi-
autonomous assets.  This program was initiated because of 
the DoD's increased focus on meeting both the challenges of 
Information Age Warfare, as well as those caused by the 
large size and dispersed assets of DoD defense forces 
                     
4 D. Alberts, J. Garska, and F. Stein, “Network Centric Warfare: 
Developing and Leveraging Information Superiority.” National Defense 
University Press, 1999. 
4during operations.  “Today, Forces are increasingly 
burdened by the lack of a coherent strategy to “control” 
large numbers of dispersed assets.  Distributing those 
assets geographically, loosely federated by networks, only 
serves to increase complexity.”5  To address this and other 
C2 issues, a major objective of the Wolf PAC operation will 
be to conduct operational experiments that examine C2 
challenges of distributed networked forces in joint Sea 
Based and Special Operations missions.  Ultimately, 
creating a shared awareness of elements distributed and 
employed across the battlespace will give decision makers 
and warfighters a tremendous advantage in operational 
tempo. 
The OFT has stated that its intent is to increase 
experimental transaction rates generating higher learning 
rates that enable the DoD to quickly produce investment 
options that adapt to an uncertain future.  These 
investment options can only be correctly decided upon if 
the proper ROI can be determined from the Wolf PAC’s 
conceptual and operational approaches for improving the C2 
development process.  
C. WOLF PAC STILETTO SHIP PLATFORM 
One of several Wolf PAC operational assets is the 
Stiletto ship, a high-speed, carbon reinforced fiber craft 
vessel.  It is one of the major assets and the main 
undertaking of the Wolf PAC program.  The OFT believes that 
in order to win future littoral combat operations it will 
require a diverse variety of assets, networked and 
distributed as a joint force.  It also believes the 
                     
5 Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation, Wolf PAC 
Transforming Defense, Distributed Adaptive Operations, p. 1.  
5Stiletto platform will meet the needs of this requirement. 
The OFT defines the Stiletto's value and purpose to be: 
Stiletto represents one of the many assets to be 
used for distributed operations, purposely 
designed to investigate the underlying rules for 
success and survival in complex environments such 
as the littoral. Stiletto is designed to explore 
the scalability of non-mechanical dynamic lift, 
composite construction technology, high-speed 
performance and its application to military 
operations. Stiletto and craft like her are not 
meant to replace or compete with capital ships of 
the line; instead they are intended to have 
capital potential in every hull.6  
Additionally, some of the Stiletto’s capabilities 
include littoral operations such as mine counter measures, 
direct support of Special Operation Forces, launch and 
retrieve an 11m-Rigid Inflatable Boat, as well as launch 
and operate unmanned vehicles to include Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAV) from the upper deck.  All of the 
capabilities can be considered combat multipliers.  
However, since the Stiletto does not compete with other 
capital ships but does demonstrate its capital potential in 
every hull, there should be an accurate measure of what the 
additional value or potential of this platform provides to 
the Navy.   
D. RESEARCH OBJECTIVES 
The objective of this research is to analyze the 
potential benefits for investing in the Wolf PAC 
operational C2 concept and the operational asset the 
Stiletto ship could provide to the U.S. Navy in littoral 
operations using a Knowledge Value-Added methodology.  
Currently, within the DoD there is not a defensibly 
                     
6 Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation, Wolf PAC 
Transforming Defense, Distributed Adaptive Operations, p. 5. 
6objective methodology to determine ROI.  The models will 
assist in assessing the efficiency of Wolf PAC operational 
C2 concept and its operational surrogate, the Stiletto 
platform, in terms of process capacity and productivity. 
This analysis will apply an ROI methodology capable of 
demonstrating these advantages in common units of 
monetization of value measurements, (i.e., allowing, 
revenue, as well as cost).   
Development of these models will help to determine 
output measures that can be monetized using the market 
comparable approach.  Because the methodology used will be 
an analytical approach, it will provide decision-makers 
additional comparable information by which to judge and 
compare existing operational processes or systems 
associated with the Wolf PAC.  The results of this 
application of methodology may be applied to this and 
similar DoD programs, thus enabling decision makers to make 
more disciplined program acquisition and budget decisions.      
E. METHODOLOGY 
This thesis will attempt to model the current Command 
and Control process, as it applies to the Wolf PAC 
operations to produce an improved model which incorporates 
information technologies that support distributive 
operations.  This thesis will also attempt to model several 
of Stiletto ship operational capabilities and make 
comparisons to the current model of the Navy’s existing 
littoral operations capable platform such as Coastal Mine 
Hunter (MHC), in order to determine the increased value of 
the Stiletto ship over the existing Navy ships.  The  
 
 
7Knowledge Value-Added (KVA) methodology will be utilized to 
measure the impact that improved processes and technologies 
will have on the current process.   
The analysis will include identification of all major 
processes, sub-processes, inputs, and respective outputs.  
Additionally, the analysis will define all cost and value 
data related to each asset in the process, both human and 
information technology (IT) driven.  Analyzing the sub-
process for the models will include the surrogate value 
measure, time-to-learn, number of personnel involved and 
the number of times each process is executed.  Subject 
Matter Experts (SMEs) will be interviewed to validate that 
the processes, persons involved and execution times are 
accurate.  Market comparable values will be used to help 
estimate the revenue surrogates that will in turn help to 
monetize value in the methodology.  The time to learn, also 
known as the knowledge embedded in each sub-process, will 
be multiplied by the number of executions of those sub-
processes.  The resulting figures will be used as a basis 
for the KVA approach for allocating revenue at the sub-
process level. The end result is a ROI performance ratio.  
This resulting value may be used by decision makers as an 
acceptable method to examine values of a future operational 





















THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK  
9II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. LITTORAL WARFARE 
Seventy-five percent of the world's population lives 
within 100 miles of a coastline.  The United States Navy’s 
mission for Littoral Warfare is to maintain a dominant 
presence within those coastal regions which are of 
strategic importance. To do this, the Office of Force 
Transformation (OFT) developed an initiative called Wolf 
Pac/Stiletto to provide command and control (C2) as well as 
provide shallow water operations within the region. Wolf 
PAC will explore emerging concept-technology pairings to 
develop near term solutions to coordinate with coherence 
large numbers of geographically dispersed, networked 
assets.  
B. MINING CHALLENGES 
Mines located in the shallow and very shallow7 water of 
the littoral environment have the same effect on the 
movement of vessels that a minefield has on forces ashore: 
they slow the movement and channel the forces into killing 
zones.8 Mines can impede the safe execution of U.S. Naval 
activities and constrain the ability of the United States 
to pursue the nation’s interests.  
Mines are pervasive, cheap, and do not require a 
sophisticated military force to employ them. The breakup of 
the former Soviet Union and their need for hard currency 
                     
7 In mine warfare terminology the term ”very shallow water,” or VSW, 
refers to those mines located from the outer edge of the surf zone to 
the two and one half fathom curve, or 21 feet. The term “shallow water” 
refers to those mines located between 21 and 25 feet in depth.   
8 Kenneth M. Kobell, Lieutenant Colonel, USMCR, “Putting America’s 
911 Force on Hold,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September, 1995, 
p. 73. 
10
could easily lead to even wider export of mines.9  The ship 
primarily used for mine hunting has always been the MHC 
Osprey class ship.  The ability to tackle mine hunting 
operations has increased the littoral capabilities with the 
new development of the Stiletto platform.   
C. OPERATIONAL SURVIVAL 
In order to survive and win in future littoral 
operations it will require a diverse variety of assets 
amalgamated as a networked, distributed joint force. It 
demands a force that shares information widely and takes 
advantage of pattern ambiguity, readily consumes increased 
information volume and can adapt to ever increasing complex 
conditions. Scale-matched assets are critical to the 
architectural structure of Wolf PAC.  
Stiletto represents one of the many assets to be used 
for distributed operations, purposely designed to 
investigate the underlying rules for success and survival 
in complex environments such as the littoral. The Stiletto 
ship is a composite – fiber, high-speed vessel, designed to 
explore the scalability of non-mechanical dynamic lift, 
composite construction technology, high-speed performance 
and its application to military operations.  
  
                     
9 Larry K. Brown, Major, USMC, “Mine Countermeasures and Amphibious 
Operations a Line in the Sea,” June 20, 1991, p. 6. 
11
 
Figure 1.   Stiletto.10 
 
Stiletto’s specific characteristics incorporate 
modularity at multiple levels and use an electronic keel 
(data bus) for rapid mission reconfiguration which provides 
the necessary flexibility for SOF-like forces to deploy, 
modify and tailor capabilities to emerging challenges. 
Stiletto also explores high payload fractions capable of 
shallow water operations for speed of deployment and access 
to unprepared and contested zones. Stiletto’s main purpose 
is to accommodate, launch and retrieve an 11m-RIB as well 
as launch and operate unmanned vehicles to Unmanned Aerial 
Vehicles (UAV) from the upper deck. Stiletto will also 
represent one of the many nodes within the Wolf PAC 
experiment providing circulatory system needs regulated by 
the demand centered neural network of Sense and Respond 
Logistics.11 
                     10 Technical Exploration Operational Experimentation Industrial 
expansion, Stiletto / Wolf PAC. 
<http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_398_Wolfpac%20ho
wler%20plan.pdf> (accessed August 28, 2006). 
11 Sense and Respond Logistics (S&RL) is an OFT initiative that 
seeks to transform how the defense departments sustains geographically 
dispersed and distributed adaptive forces. 
12
 
Figure 2.   Electronic Keel.12 
 
D. WOLF PAC OPERATION  
Wolf PAC will explore emerging concept-technology 
pairings to develop near term solutions to coordinate with 
coherent large numbers of geographically dispersed 
networked assets. Wolf PAC has four key objectives: 
1. Create Options 
i.  Acting on NCW principles of war, produce 
physical and virtual surrogates that allocate 
joint networked capabilities 
ii.  Preserve design teams and intellectual talent 
to create a stable commercial market 
iii. Loosen requirements – foster incentives for 
innovation by setting broad objectives 
iv. Increase variety and numbers 
v. Broaden the technology base 
2. Increase Transaction Rates 
i. Provide a venue for developing operational 
experience through immersion 
ii. Establish high numbers of operational 
experiments with imperfect surrogates 
                     12 Wolf PAC, 
<http://www.oft.osd.mil/initiatives/stiletto/docs/Wolf%20PAC%20Componen
ts%20and%20Participants.pdf> (accessed August 28, 2006). 
13
iii. Create new knowledge and tacit understanding 
of complex problems 
3. Ensure Higher Rates of Learning 
i.  Produce high numbers of co-evolutionary 
cycles to solve for complex problems 
ii. Iterate organizational relationships that 
dynamically adapt to context mission 
dependent and scale relevant challenges 
iii. Observe, understand and influence behaviors 
at the scale that events occur 
4. Create Overmatching Complexity 
i. Engineer for collective behavior and design 
toward networked effects 
ii. Understand connection topologies and 
connection strengths 
iii. Increase diversity at the right scale 
iv. Synchronize high numbers of networked 
capabilities 
E. THE APPROACH 
Wolf PAC will describe, develop, and explore 
measurable design rules & metrics 
a.  Design Principles for Distributed Operations 
and Distributed Networked Forces13 
• Recombination: ability to aggregate, distribute 
or interchange physical, informational or logical 
elements and connections 
• Dispersion: avoid spatial, informational, or 
logical centers of gravity thereby confounding 
adversarial C2 and scouting resources 
• Mobility: sufficient speed for rapid relocation 
of elements and reconfiguration of elemental 
collectives (physical or logical means) 
• Pattern masking & ambiguity: envelope management 
performance. Greater numbers of elements provide 
physically smaller elements and the ability to 
hide among the clutter  
                     
13 Jeffrey R. Cares, Raymond Christian and Robert Manke, 
Fundamentals of Distributed, Networked Forces and the Engineering of 
Distributed Systems, NUWC-NPT Technical Report 11,366, May 9, 2002. 
14
• Proximity: uncouple physical component’s direct 
proximity to threat (effect of mass without the 
massing of forces or elements) 
• Flexibility: principles of modularity – Fluid 
system substructures with range of modular 
interoperability options – measure of adaptively 
• Persistence: ability to operate w/o disruption of 
cyclic logistics and operations 
b. Investigate Networked Behavior of Large 
Numbers of Geographically Dispersed Assets 
• Speed of response: Diffusion rates, Number of 
Nodes 
• Speed of command: Average path length, neutrality 
• Self-synchronization: Path Horizon, Auto-
catalytic Sets 
• Shared awareness: Clustering distribution, 
organizational relationships, between-ness 
c.  Deliverables 
• Technical Model – evaluate – validate – modify 
simulation tools & evolutionary algorithms to 
emulate complex environments. 
• Determine network relationships between 
surrogates 
• Establish standards, protocols, and 
interfaces for surrogates 
• Operational 
• CONOPS for distributed adaptive operations – 
how many in what variety &combination using 
NCW conceptual framework. Determine how to 
employ, deploy, sustain, and C2 a 
distributed, networked force 
• Applied engineering solutions to coordinate 








F.  KVA AND THE USE OF IT 
KVA provides a means to measure the amount of 
knowledge with an organization, in equivalent units and 
that are required to produce the outputs of an 
organization. 
There four assumptions that allow KVA to compare units 
of change within organizations: 
1. Humans and technology in organizations take 
inputs and change them into outputs through core 
processes. 
2. All outputs can be described in terms of the 
amount of change (i.e., complexity) required to 
produce them. 
3. All outputs can be described in terms of the time 
required by an “average” learner to learn how to 
produce them. Learning time can be considered a 
surrogate for the amount of organizational 
knowledge required to produce the outputs. KVA 
describes these common units of learning time 
(i.e., units of output) by using the term 
knowledge units. 
4. A knowledge unit is proportional to a unit of 
complexity, which is proportional to a unit of 
change.14 
G.  PROBLEM-SOLVING CONTRIBUTIONS OF KVA TO REAL OPTIONS 
ANALYSIS 
There are four phases in which real options occur over 
time: 
• Phase One – The structure of the problem is 
established 
• Phase Two – The options of the Plan and Frame are 
laid out 
• Phase Three – The option is implemented over time 
• Phase Four – Track options results and adjust 
decision paths 
                     14 Jonathan Mun, Real Options Analysis, pp. 573-574. 
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The Phase One in the KVA problem-solving can make 
significant contributions by providing a higher quality of 
fundamental data inputs to the structure of the problem. 
Real options analyses are currently using project-level, or 
even company-level, data for real options analysis. 
Currently there no specific organizational data that can be 
used. KVA is a tool that can analyze the effects of core 
processes on a project and provide raw data on estimated 
organizational revenues and costs.  
In addition, KVA can make major impact in Phase Four. 
As KVA data is collected, it can be used to assemble near 
real-time option performance assessments.  
17
III. THE KNOWLEDGE VALUE ADDED METHODOLOGY 
A.  ISSUE OF VALUE 
Within the Department of Defense (DoD) defining value 
or determining return on investment (ROI) for specific DoD 
program/project or major end-item procurement has remained 
a difficult and inexact science.  In contrast to the DoD, 
the profit oriented business sector can readily define 
value or ROI.  In measurable business oriented terms, value 
is defined when one product bests another in delivering 
greater value to a business sector.  This usually occurs 
either when one product efficiently reduces the firm's 
costs in some aspect of its operations, when it enhances 
the firm's revenues, or when it achieves some combination 
of the two. Such valuable products improve a firm's bottom 
line and ultimately determine how "value" is defined to the 
business institution and its customers.   
Additionally, ROI, which is a performance measurement, 
is used to evaluate the efficiency of an investment or to 
compare the efficiency of a number of different 
investments; ROI is calculated as the benefit (return) of 
an investment divided by the cost of the investment; the 




It is the metric of choice by the majority of business 
sector because of its usability, versatility and 
simplicity.  However, because there is no goal of creating 
profit or gain in dollars within the DoD, there is no  
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definable method to quantify or qualify the determination 
of value or return in investment for many DoD 
programs/projects. 
Determination of value lends itself to metrics 
associated with monetary assessment.  For example, in the 
private sector a price per unit assignment can be assigned 
to outputs, whereas, this can not be done within the DoD 
because of the non-profit orientation of its process 
outputs. Determining value contributions from 
programs/projects in a monetary sense to increase 
operational readiness or increase combat effectiveness can 
not be done.  To resolve this problem, a common unit to be 
used in the value determination of DoD program/projects 
output, that can be used in both operational and financial 
analysis and decision making is an important factor in 
resolving the problem.         
B.  KNOWLEDGE VALUE SOLUTION 
The Knowledge Value-Added (KVA) methodology was 
developed by Dr. Thomas Housel (Naval Postgraduate School) 
and Dr. Valery Kanevsky (Agilent Lab).  Its purpose was to 
help guide business process re-engineering efforts of 
organizations.  KVA methodology was designed to assist in 
determining the value in an organization’s core processes, 
employees, or IT investments, instead of merely focusing on 
cutting costs.  The KVA methodology takes these core 
processes and knowledge assets of an organization and 
provides a methodology for allocating revenue and cost to 
these assets based on the amount of change each produces.15   
 
 
                     15 T. Housel and A. Bell, Measuring and Managing Knowledge.  Boston: 
McGraw-Hill 2001. p. 92. 
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The methodology then determines the value or benefit by 
assessing the cost of each sub-process or knowledge asset 
relative to its overall contribution.     
1.   KVA Theory 
The basic theory behind KVA methodology was based upon 
a description of all process outputs in similar units.  One 
assumes that the purpose of a business is to produce value 
by way of its processes, thereby transforming inputs into 
suitable outputs.  The theory was derived from the concepts 
of complexity and entropy.16 
The changes organizational processes make in the 
structure of inputs to outputs can be described in a common 
way. The concept of entropy is defined as a measurement of 
the degree of disorder--or amount of the change in a 
system. In the context of business processes it can be used 
as a surrogate for the amount of changes that a process 
makes to inputs to produce attendant outputs.  These 
process-induced changes can be measured in terms of the 
equivalent corresponding changes in entropy.  
KVA is considered a framework for measuring the value 
of organizational knowledge assets.  This framework which 
is rooted in the knowledge economy provides organizations a 
way to equate a common metric such as price and cost, to 
the amount of knowledge in known core processes and assets.  
The results of a KVA analysis are known as Return on 
Knowledge (ROK).  ROK is, therefore, the resulting ratio 
between the price and cost for these determined common 
units of knowledge.  Ultimately, ROK supplies necessary 
information relating to the value or measure of benefit.  
                     16 T. Housel and O. El Sawy, Model for Measuring the Return on 
Information Technology: A Proof of Concept Demonstration, Presentation 
2001. p. 11. 
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2.  KVA Assumptions 
This application of a KVA framework has wider 
implications in that it may be aptly used within the 
context of organizational processes.  The framework is 
based on an operating premise that procedural knowledge 
used to produce outputs for a process may also be viewed as 
a surrogate of process outputs.  These processes with 
predetermined outputs may be described in terms of the 
amount of time it takes the average learner to understand 
how to produce those outputs.17 
Housel et al. fully describes this process in their 
demonstration for ICIS 2001: 
At a given point in time, a company’s total 
process outputs produce its revenue.  It follows, 
that the procedural knowledge required to produce 
those outputs is a surrogate for the revenue. 
Further, if this procedural knowledge, which is 
distributed among people and IT, can be described 
in common units, then it is possible to allocate 
corporate revenue to these units of knowledge. 
This would allow establishment of a common price 
per unit of procedural knowledge. It follows that 
price per unit of procedural knowledge is a 
surrogate for price per unit of common output. 
This formulation allows a direct linkage between 
corporate revenue and the procedural knowledge 
distributed among the people and IT used to 
produce the revenue.18 
The figure below depicts the fundamental assumptions 
of KVA.  It is the underlying model which explains that 
change, knowledge, and value are proportionate. 




F ig u r e  1  – P r o c e d u r a l K n o w le d g e  is  P r o p o r t io n a t e  to  
C h a n g e
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2 .  I f  A  is  c h a n g e d  b y  P  in  t o  B  th e n  “ v a lu e ”  ∝ “ c h a n g e ”
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Figure 3.    The Housel/Kanevsky Value-Added Cycle.19 
 
As noted the KVA theory offers a way to describe all 
process outputs in equivalent units.  This becomes 
advantageous for several reasons:   
• The ability to compare all processes in terms of 
their relative productivity 
• The ability to allocate revenue to a common unit 
of output 
• The ability to describe the value added by IT in 
terms of the outputs it produces  
• The ability to relate outputs to the cost to 
produce those outputs in common units 
• A common unit of measure for organizational 
productivity20  
An organizations ability to decompose inputs into 
common units of outputs allows processes to be assessed 
from the same common baseline reference.  It also allows 
for revenue and cost to be assigned to these processes.  At 
the point that valuation of processes can be directly 
associated with a financial metrics, KVA results can be 
used in a similar manner to other profitability metrics.   
                     19 Housel and Bell, 2001. 
20 Housel, et al., December 2001, p. 11. 
22
3.  Approaches to KVA 
Learning Time Approach Process Description 
Approach 
Binary Query Method 
Identify compound process 
and its component 
processes. 
Identify compound process 
and its component 
processes. 
Identify compound process 
and its component 
processes. 
Establish common units to 
measure learning time. 
Describe the products in 
terms of the instructions 
required to reproduce 
them and select unit of 
process description 
Create a set of binary 
YES/NO questions such 
that all possible outputs 
are represented as a 
sequence of YES/NO 
answers. 
Calculate learning time 
to execute each component 
process. 
Calculate number of 
process description 
words, pages in manual, 
lines of computer code 
pertaining to each 
process. 
Calculate length of 
sequence of YES/NO 
answers for each 
component processes. 
Designate sampling time 
period long enough to 
capture a representative 
sample of the compound 
processes’ final 
product/service output. 
Designate sampling time 
period long enough to 
capture a representative 
sample of the compound 
processes’ final 
product/service output. 
Designate sampling time 
period long enough to 
capture a representative 
sample of the compound 
processes’ final 
product/service output. 
Multiply the learning 
time for each component 
process by the number of 
times the component 
executes during sample 
period. 
Multiply the number of 
process words used to 
describe each component 
process by the number of 
times the component 
executes during sample 
period. 
Multiply the length of 
the YES/NO string for 
each component process by 
the number of times this 
component executes during 
sample period. 
Allocate revenue to 
component processes in 
proportion to the 
quantities generated by 
previous step. 
Allocate revenue to 
component processes in 
proportion to the 
quantities generated by 
previous step. 
Allocate revenue to 
component processes in 
proportion to the 
quantities generated by 
previous step. 
Calculate the cost to 
execute each component 
process, calculate return 
on investment per process 
by dividing revenue 
allocated to component 
process by cost of 
component process. 
Calculate the cost to 
execute each component 
process, calculate return 
on investment per process 
by dividing revenue 
allocated to component 
process by cost of 
component process. 
Calculate the cost to 
execute each component 
process, calculate return 
on investment per process 
by dividing revenue 
allocated to component 
process by cost of 
component process. 
Table 1.   Approaches to KVA.21 
                     21 David Walsh, “Knowledge Value Added: Assessing both Fixed and 
Value.” Business Process Audits.Com. White Papers. Business Process 
Audits.Com, 13 August 1998. 
<http://www.businessprosaudits.com/kvawalsh.com> [06June2005] (accessed 
August 10, 2006).  
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a.  Learning Time 
In the learning time approach the amount of 
knowledge is measure based on the time it would take an 
average individual to learn how to complete the process 
correctly.  The measurements should be in common units of 
time (i.e., hours, days, and weeks) and should be 
verifiably reliable. Generally SME’s, will provide actual 
estimates of the learning time required for a given process 
based on formal and informal training times, to include 
experience on the job, training manuals, distance education 
and any other source of training that would be relevant to 
the generation of an output by means of the process 
indicated. KVA makes possible the initial estimate for 
allocating revenue or sales dollars to the various core 
processes. The goal of KVA is to establish relative orders 
of magnitude for the amount of knowledge embedded in core 
processes.22  
b.  Process Description 
This approach measures the number of instructions 
needed to reproduce the outputs produced. Using the process 
description approach enables the KVA methodology to achieve 
a higher level of detail in the process description than 
does the learning time approach. It requires a more 
detailed and analytical description of each process and the 
amount of instructions needed to produce each output. The 
process instructions are calibrated in terms of their 
complexity.23 
c.  Binary Query Method 
This approach creates a set of binary yes or no 
questions such that all possible outputs are represented as  




sequences of yes or no answers, which are equated to bits.  
The sequences of answers are determined and value is 
attributed to the outcome that is produced.24 
C.  RETURN ON KNOWLEDGE (ROK) 
Return on Knowledge (ROK) is ratio which represented 
by a numerator that depicts revenue allocated to an amount 
of  knowledge required to complete a given process 
successfully, in proportion to the total amount of 
knowledge required to generate the total outputs.  The 
denominator of the ratio is the cost to execute the 
knowledge within the process.25  In this process knowledge 
is considered a surrogate for common units of outputs.   
This ROK ratio identifies the value added within process 
provided by the knowledge assets.  Understanding the 
results of ROK can provide decision makers with valuable 
information and insight into core processes of project or 
program.  ROK can provide a productivity measure for 
current knowledge assets and depict how effective and 
efficient knowledge assets may be when applied throughout 
different areas within a process.  Using KVA methods ROK 
can be an indicator for ROI.  The analytical way ROK value 
is determined makes it invaluable to both profit oriented 
and non-profit oriented organizations like the DoD.   
                     24 Housel and Bell, 2001. 
25 Web ProForum Tutorials., Knowledge Value Added (KVA) Methodology. 
<http://www.ieg.org>, (accessed June 15, 2006). 
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IV.  PROOF OF CONCEPT  
The OFT has several major initiatives that pertain to 
exploration of C2 operational concepts.  For the purpose of 
this thesis, the proof of concept is focused on two areas.  
Part I assesses the impact of the Wolf PAC operation upon 
DoD C2 processes.  Part II assesses the value of one of the 
major initiatives of the OFT, Wolf PAC Stiletto ship mine 
hunting operations.  The reason this thesis uses the KVA 
methodology in two case concepts is to demonstrate that the 
KVA methodology is not one dimensional in its use.  Though 
the process remains the same, KVA can be utilized for 
various types of assessments or valuations.  In Part I KVA 
will be used to demonstrate its ability to improve a 
current process.  In Part II of this thesis an assessment 
of a current Navy ship’s operational standard will 
evaluated in comparison to a new prototype ship and its new 
operational standard process.     
A.  PART I: A C2 (CONCEPTUAL MODEL) 
The Wolf PAC operation, as previously noted, is a 
group of operational experiments designed to explore C2 
operational concepts of geographically dispersed, 
networked, autonomous and semi-autonomous assets.  In order 
for the OFT to genuinely explore C2 concepts, there should 
be some method of evaluating current C2 structured 
processes.  The research questions posed in this thesis are 
essentially threefold:  (1) what is the current state of the 
DOD’s C2 structure, (2) how is it evaluated, and (3) if 
changes are made for the improvement of the process, how is 
the improvement measured.   
One major experiment, known as Stiletto, is a combat 
craft initiative designed to benefit from densely networked 
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sensor technologies, tactical space assets, unmanned 
vehicles, and new hull forms which take advantage of 
modularity, speed, and complexity to increase lethality and 
survivability.   
1.  Objective 
The objective of this portion of the research is to 
evaluate a conceptual model of the C2 process, utilize this 
model to assess the value of identifying areas in which the 
C2 processes can be made more efficient and effective.  The 
expectations are twofold: (1) to produce a new C2 
perspective based on current concepts and (2) generate 
ideas for operational C2 to be evaluated using a common 
value metric based on the KVA methodology.  This 
methodology was chosen because it is capable of producing 
an objective measure and is based on easily defined 
criteria.  Once processes are defined and baseline measures 
are created the overall “as-is” process data can be 
compared to the additions or changes within the existing 
processes.  The resulting comparisons can then be made to 
current, “as-is” scenario based on the “to-be” scenario, 
and the “radical to-be” scenarios.  These comparisons can 
be used to evaluate the C2 process structures and possible 
process changes to the C2 operational process. 
2. Data Collection Methodology 
It is recognized that some form of the C2 process 
happens at almost every level of command and that commands 
and the higher echelons tend to use a more formal and 
detailed process approach to C2.  However, there is no DoD 
standard or formal structure process for C2 on which this 
study could be modeled.  Therefore, for the purposes of 
evaluating C2 for this thesis, a conceptual C2 model was 
developed.  The underlying assumptions were that the model 
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created would represent a similar methodology or framework 
currently in use for the C2 operations of military 
organizations.   
Understanding that a process needed to be defined, the 
research team chose Colonel John Boyd’s “Observe, Orient, 
Decide, Act (OODA) Loop”26 model to represent the current 
process for conducting C2 operations.  The OODA loop 
performs several functions within the C2 domain.  It 
defines boundaries, translates ideas and observations into 
action, shows the process as cyclical in nature, and 
facilitates the conceptual outline of the C2 process. It 
has significant limitations, however, with respect to 
providing an explanation of the activities within the 
defined boundaries. 
Combined with the Marine Corps Planning Process 
(MCPP), Boyd’s OODA loop is used to create a conceptual C2 
model. “The Marine Corps Planning Process is an internal 
planning process used by Marine Corps operating forces. It 
aligns with and complements the joint deliberate and crisis 
action planning processes found in Joint Pub 5-0, Doctrine 
for Planning Joint Operations.”27 
The processes, steps, and products associated with the 
MCPP were used as inputs and outputs, or sub-processes, to 
the major steps within the OODA loop.  Based on discussions 
with SMEs, the research team developed this conceptual 
process as a viable representation of the current 
operational C2 model.  An examination of the newly 
developed “as-is” or existing processes shows that in order 
                     26 OODA Loop is defined. 
27 Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Planning Process. Marine 
Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA. pp. 1-2. 
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to improve the current C2 process, there should be a 
departure from the traditional structure based on 
centralized control and limited information sharing. A 
successful approach requires a C2 concept that 
decentralizes control through improved collaborative  
information sharing and shared situational awareness.  
Ultimately, this will lead to forces that are self-
synchronized.   
3.  Modeling a C2 Process 
For this thesis the C2 process is represented by the 
OODA process.  It is understood the OODA process was one 
that is cyclical in nature.  However, in order to use the 
KVA analysis accurately, the flowchart representing the C2 
process had to be depicted as a linear process.  This would 
represent one cycle through the OODA loop representing the 
C2 process.  Again, the process flowchart was developed, 
using OODA as the process with the inputs and outputs 
represented by the some of the major tenets of the Marine 


















Figure 4.   As-Is Flowchart. 
 
The process as it is shown represents the conceptual 
outline of the C2 process for this thesis.  Within this C2 
loop are the processes that utilize actionable sub-
processes to be evaluated. The following is a brief 






Sub-Process Name Sub-Process Description 
Mission Analysis Review and analyze orders, 
guidance, and other 
information that is provided 
by higher headquarters in 
order. 
 
To produce a unit mission 
statement. 
Course of Action 
Developments 
Process is designed to 
generate options for follow-
on wargaming and comparison 
that satisfy the mission, 
commander’s intent, and 
guidance of the commander. 
Course of Action Wargaming Allows the staff and 
subordinate commanders to 
gain a common understanding 
of friendly—and possible 
enemy—courses of action. 
IPB/Info PB Intelligence preparation of 
the battlespace enables 
planners to view the 
battlespace in terms of the 
threat and the environment. 
 
It helps planners determine 
how the enemy will react to 
proposed friendly COA. 
COA Selection The commander evaluates all 
friendly courses of action 
against established criteria, 
evaluates them against each 
other, and selects the course 
of action that he believes 
will best accomplish the 
mission. 
 
Commander’s Intent The commander’s personal 
expression of the purpose of 
the operation. It should be 
clear and concise. The 
purpose of providing intent 
is to allow subordinates to 
exercise judgment and 
initiative—to depart from the 
plan when the unforeseen 
occurs—in a way that is 
consistent with the higher 
commander’s aims. 
Integrated Planning A disciplined approach to 
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Sub-Process Name Sub-Process Description 
planning that is systematic, 
coordinated, and thorough. 
Mission Orders Development During mission order 
development commander’s COA 
decision, mission statement, 
and commander’s intent and 
guidance to develop orders 
that direct unit actions. 
Orders serve as the principal 
means by which the commander 
expresses his decision, 
intent, and guidance.  
Transition Transition is an orderly 
handover of a plan or order 
as it is passed to those 
tasked with execution of the 
operation. 
Act/Execute Carrying out plan or orders 
of the commander’s intent. 
Table 2.   Sub-Process Description.  
 
The major assumptions associated with the purpose of 
this chain of core processes are: 
• It should support the commander/decision-makers 
in making decisions in a time constrained and 
uncertain environment 
• It should direct and coordinate actions 
• It should develop a shared situational awareness 
• It should generate expectations about how actions 
will evolve and then affect the desired outcome. 
• It supports the exercise initiative 
Ultimately, with this conceptual C2 model the 
processes should allow the decision-maker the ability, per 
the OODA loop, to observe, orient, decide, and act 
effectively in the midst of uncertainty. Ultimately this 
provides an effective way of achieving a desired end 
state.28 
                     28 Department of the Navy, Marine Corps Planning Process. Marine 
Corps Logistics Base, Albany, GA, p. 7. 
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4.  Assumptions and Data 
The following assumptions as they apply to the 
conceptual c2 model, KVA proof of concept.   
a.  Length of C2 Process 
For this model the cycle period is 72 hours.  For 
this reason, some annual cost data is adjusted to reflect 
this time period. 
b.  Cost Assumptions 
Cost of active duty military personnel was derived 
from annual DoD military personnel salary for Fiscal Year 
2006 as presented on the Defense Finance and Accounting 
Service.29    
 
OPT total costs per hour based on yearly salaries 
Personnel Rank Yearly Salaries 
1 0-7 $121,000.00 
7 0-6 $99,000.00 
7 0-5 $82,000.00 
8 0-4 $70,000.00 
4 0-3 $55,000.00 
 
27 $2,168,000.00  
Average cost per hour $30.88 
Table 3.   OPT Total Costs Per Hour. 
 
c. Surrogate Revenue Assumptions 
Surrogate revenues are based on a market 
comparable approach which attempts to identify business 
sector profit-oriented organizations which produce 
                     29 Defense finance and Accounting Service. “Basic Pay” 
<http://www.dod.mil/dfas/militarypay/newinformation/WebPayTableVersion2
006updated.pdf> [01 January 2006] (accessed August 22, 2006). 
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comparable outputs to the particular DoD non-profit 
organization or entity.  This approach assumes if outputs 
are similar, the particular business sector’s processes to 
generate the outputs are comparable to the DoD organizations 
processes to obtain outputs.   Also, this approach assumes 
that profit oriented private sector organizations have 
placed a monetary value to the comparable outputs yielding a 
revenue stream for the commercial entity and monetary value 
can be applied to the DoD organization.  This monetary value 
can then be used to create pseudo revenue for the DoD 
organization.  For this research, the following business 
organization was used to derive market comparable values. 
Since 1970, Kennedy Information has been the 
leading source for competitive intelligence and 
market analysis on Management and IT consulting 
services.  They provide strategic support and 
custom research to buyers and sellers of 
management consulting and IT services. Leveraging 
over 30 years of knowledge in the consulting 
profession and proprietary databases as a 
foundation, Kennedy Information offers 
unparalleled industry expertise and hands-on 
experience to help providers and buyers of 
consulting services maximize the value of their 
relationships.30  
 
Kennedy Information Consultant Fee 
Personal Salary Per Hour Position 
1 $341.00 Partner 
7 $287.00 Project Leaders 
9 $231.00 Senior Consultant 
5 $192.00 Consultant 
                     30 Association of Executive search Consultants. 
<http://www.aesc.org/article/sokennedy/?PHPSESSID=04f685718020c93a700ef
775bd6c92c5> (accessed August 6, 2006). 
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Kennedy Information Consultant Fee 
Personal Salary Per Hour Position 
5 $147.00 Analysis 
Total  27 $6,124.00 
$227.00 Consultant Fee / hour is multiplied by total man-
hours to generate equivalent revenue 
Table 4.   Consultant Fee. 
 
d. Other Assumptions 
IT Learning Time.  It was assumed that the 
knowledge embedded in information technology (IT) systems 
can be derived by averaging the time it would take an 
average learner to learn how to produce the same outputs 
produced by the IT system in a single sub-process output 
cycle. The following assumptions will be applied in the 
analysis listed in Table 5.     
 
Year= 52 Weeks 260 days   
Week= 5 Days 50 hours   
Nominal Learning time total = 52 weeks  2600 hours 
Table 5.   Assumptions. 
 
5.  “As Is” KVA Analysis  
An analysis of each sub-process within this C2 process 
is provided in Table 5.  The core processes listed have 
been defined by the SME’s who were either trained in the 
Joint Planning Process/Marine Corps Planning Process or 
were operationally utilized or those who participated in 




a.  Number of Iterations of Process in Each 
Cycle 
The number of iterations of process in each cycle 
represents the number of times each sub-process is executed 
by the specified staff.  In this process the specific sub-
process may have multiple occurrences at different points 
within the overall process.   
b. Number of People Involved 
The “Number of People Involved” category 
represents the number of personnel which are involved in 
the specific sub-process.  Personnel are assigned to staff 
sections.  The number of participating personnel from each 
staff section is based upon SME estimates, noting there is 
no standard.     
c.  Staff Justification for People Involved 
This category identifies the individuals, staffs 
or staff members that are involved in a specific sub-
process. 
d. Percentage of IT  
This is a representation of the extent to which 
automation is utilized in the sub-process.  IT is measured 
on a scale from zero percent to 100 percent.  Estimating 
the IT involvement accurately ensures that knowledge which 
is embedded in the IT resources is accounted for within 
sub-processes. Also the IT column identifies how 
information technology is used to complete the process, 
such as a word processing program, communication programs, 
or other software designed and implemented for the purposes 
of enabling C2 management. The degree of automation in the 
sub-process is considered the amount of outputs that are 
completed by IT resources. 
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e. Ordinal Ranking 
The ordinal ranking of the sub-processes was 
assigned by the SME who ranked the sub-processes based on 
complexity to learn each process. Lower numbers equate to 
less complexity while larger numbers depict more 
complexity.  The complexity of the processes is also 
indicated by the surrogate learning time (SLT) column where 
the most complex tasks are presumed to take longer to 
learn.  This ranking is completed independently of SLT 
estimates.  In order to demonstrate the reliability of the 
ranking estimates, a correlation is derived mathematically 
between ordinal ranking and SLT.  A high correlation 
percentage between these columns is an indication that the 
estimates are accurate when compared to the complexity of 
the sub-processes and the time it takes to learn them 
(SLT). 
f.  Time to Complete  
For this modeled process, seventy-two hours is 
the total time it takes to complete this process (also the 
time needed to complete the sub-processes).   
g.  Surrogate Learning Time (SLT) 
The SLT is derived from the relative size of the 
kilo-bytes (KB) of the information manuals or classes for 
each sub-process as listed by the Marine Corps Staff 
Training class website.  Each kilo-byte is a surrogate for 
learning time and complexity in the KVA analysis. The 
correlation between these columns in this process is 
approximately 70% which is an indication that the estimates 
are accurate when compared to the complexity of the sub 
processes and the time it takes to learn them based on the 
relative size of the information manuals or classes.   
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h.  Total Knowledge (K) 
Total knowledge represents the amount of 
knowledge embedded in the sub-process.  It is determined by 
multiplying the number of personnel involved in the sub-
process, the number iterations of the sub-process, and the 
SLT.  This result is divided by the percentage of IT 
category, (1-IT %). 
i.  Surrogate-Revenue Numerator  
This surrogate-revenue is the amount of revenue 
allocated based on the percentage of the amount of 
knowledge embedded in each stage in terms of total 
knowledge.  “It can be represented as a percentage of the 
revenue or sales dollar allocated to the amount of 
knowledge required to obtain the outputs of a given process 
in proportion to the total amount of knowledge required to 
generate the corporation's salable outputs.”31 Total pseudo-
revenue was calculated by multiplying the average 
consultant fee ($227 per hour) by the number of consultants 
(27) by the number of hours (72) to complete the cycle 
through the C2 process.  The Pseudo-Revenue, or numerator, 
is derived by multiplying the allocation factor by the 
total Pseudo-Revenue for each sub-process.     
j.  Total Cost Denominator 
The denominator represents the costs that are 
used to generate the outputs or expenses of the process. 
The cost in this case, or denominator, is derived from the 
time it takes to complete a sub-process task, multiplied by 
the number of people involved per the sub-process, 
multiplied by the average cost per hour for completing the  
 
                      31 Housel and Bell, 2001.   
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work.  Military base pay for selected pay grade across 
staff section was used in order to compute the average cost 
per hour for this analysis.   
k.  Return-on-Knowledge 
Return on Knowledge (ROK) is the ratio between 
the surrogate revenue numerator and the total cost 
denominator.  This ratio allows for comparison of expenses 
and revenues associated with the embedded knowledge assets.  
This ROK will be used to compare efficiency in performance 
within a sub-process and assist in determination of 
relative value throughout the entire process.   
l. “As-Is” Data Analysis 
The format shown in Table 6 displays the core 
process subdivided into sub-processes in order to evaluate 
each sub-process and provide a method to examine its 
relative value.  This was done by placing focus on the ROK 
ratios that were produced.  The “As-Is” analysis provides a 
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The initial focuses for improvement of the C2 
process were those areas that had the lowest ROK. The ROK 
is a relative comparison between the total revenue and 
total costs columns.  The ROK percentage depicts the value 
or benefits over costs ratio for each sub-process.  The 
numbers in the ROK column can be used as the origin for 
determining which sub-processes are providing the least 
amount of value in the overall conceptual C2 process.  Low 
ROK percentages represented low ROK and added lower values 
to the overall C2 process.  It was decided to concentrate 
on these sub processes and allocate the resources to one of 
the following functions:  deleting them, merging them, 
increasing IT usage, increasing the number of iterations, 
or increasing their value by making them more efficient 
(decreases time to complete). 
The resulting “as-is” analysis provides the 
ability to create viable solutions for the improvement of 
the current C2 process by assigning measurable value to 
sub-processes.     
m. “To-Be” KVA Analysis 
The “To-be” is notional representation of 
possible results given changes to the existing “As-is” sub-
processes.  Two strategies to change or improve the current 
“As-is” process were introduced.  Not all sub-processes 
would be affected in the “To-be” modeling and should be 
assumed as static. These solutions would attempt to improve 
the ROK percentage in the areas that were originally noted 
as low ROK.  The solutions would also improve the ROK% in 
other sub-processes as well.  These solutions are the “to-
be” and “radical to-be”, respectively.  The “to-be” is 
designed to be an easier solution to implement because of 
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the low complexity and few changes to the process.  This 
solution provides noticeable improvement in the ROK 
percentage to the process without much difficulty or 
disruption to the overall designed C2 process.    
The additional solution mentioned the “radical” 
would involve major changes to the designed C2 process.  
The “radical” improvements produce even higher ROK 
percentage for the sub-processes.  However, in order to 
achieve these higher ROK percentages, more significant 
changes had to be made to the designed C2 process.  Such 
significant changes may be more difficult and may cause 
more disruption to the overall designed C2 process than 
that of the “to-be” process.  The “to-be”, “radical” and 
the “radical (2)” KVA flowcharts and spreadsheets are 
discussed in further detail. 
Noted changes made in the “To-Be” model are 
shaded in the Table 7 shown below.  ROK comparisons with 
previous “As-Is” shown at the right side of the table. 
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Changes made to the “to-be” KVA spreadsheet were 
targeted towards those areas deemed to have a low ROK 
percentage.  Those changed sub-processes were Integrated 
Planning, Transition, and Act.  The integrated planning 
cycle iterations were increased from one to three in order 
to increase situational awareness within the process.  Next, 
an adjustment was made to the time to complete the sub-
process by transferring fours hours from the Act sub-process 
to Integrated Planning sub-process.  Additionally, we added 
IT usage to the Transition sub-process.  IT usage in the 
transitional process would include increased use of IT 
management and dissemination tools such as the use of 
wireless technologies like personal data assistants (PDA’s), 
or web-castings, in order to rapidly transmit information to 
those that need it.  These changes made to the core process 
are to achieve the goal of an improved C2 process model 
with improved shared information awareness, and the 
objective of self-synchronization within the forces of the 
organization.  The results of these changes produced 
noticeable increases in the Pseudo-Revenue totals and the 
ROK percentage for the targeted sub-processes.   
n. “Radical To-Be” Analysis 
The “Radical To-be” model is a notional 
representation of possible results given changes to both 
the existing “As-is” and “To-be” sub-processes.   Noted 
changes made in the “To-Be” model are shaded in Table 8 
shown below.  ROK comparisons with previous “As-Is” shown 
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As mentioned earlier the “Radical” process is one 
that involves major changes to the designed C2 process 
model.  The major change in the “Radical” C2 approach is 
the elimination of the two sub-processes, COA Development 
and COA Selection.  We are able to eliminate these sub-
processes because of the addition collaborative IT tools 
such as planning templates, MCP’s and decision support 
templates.  This elimination also reduces the total cycle 
time of the C2 process from 72 hours to 62 hours.  The 
eliminated COA development sub-process SLT was then added 
to the Integrated Planning sub-process SLT.  Also, the 
eliminated COA selection sub-process SLT was then added to 
the COA Wargaming sub-process SLT.  Other notable changes 
include the increase usage in IT percentages in the sub-
processes and the changes in the iterations per cycle 
(i.e., # of times fired).  These changes had a significant 
effect and resulted in an increased Pseudo-Revenue and ROK 
percentage. These changes coupled with the previous “To-Be” 
modeled changes may assist in the achievement of the goal 
to improved C2, with self-synchronized forces, by 
evaluating the sub-process in a defined and measurable 
manner. 
o. Comparative Analysis 
Table 9 is a comparative analysis chart which 
displays resulting ROK results for all three KVA 
assessments; “As-Is”, “To-Be” and “Radical”, respectively.  
As described earlier the changes within the sub-processes 
for the both the “To-Be” and the “Radical” increased the 
total ROK for the sub-processes overall.  However, it is 
noted that in the “Radical” model there are several sub-
processes, while having ROK results that exceed the “As-Is” 
model ROK results by significant margins, they were sub-
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processes which had smaller ROK in some cases than the “To-
Be” ROK results as shown in Table 9.  This is explained by 
the major adjustment in the “Radical” model in which both 
the COA development and COA selection sub-processes were 
eliminated.  The elimination of these sub-processes, 
created a redistribution of the percentage of knowledge in 
each sub-process compared to total knowledge in the overall 
process, shown as the Allocation factor in each KVA table.  
This negatively impacted several sub-processes of “Radical 
model, resulting in lower ROK results.  However, the 
elimination of these sub-processes produced increased 
efficiency by reducing the cycle time of the overall 
process by seven hours over both the “As-Is” and “To-Be” 
models, while retaining an increased ROK over the “As-Is” 
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623% 623% 709% 
Transition 105% 157% 139% 
Act 266% 368% 327% 
   Total 317% 404% 382% 
Table 9.   Comparative Analysis. 
 
p.  Other Considerations 
The KVA analysis is made difficult in this 
scenario because there is not a formally structured C2 
process that can be modeled, therefore, all models will be 
different.  However, no matter the structure, KVA analysis 
still can be used if the process can be defined in the 
processes described.  This KVA analysis for this process 
provided a different way to effectively and efficiently 
find weakness in a process that would normally be difficult 
to pinpoint without using this type of analysis.  In a 
process were there was not a defined method of evaluation, 
using KVA methodology gave the ability to use a common unit 
of measurement to assess and compare the value of process 
improvement by defining the amount of knowledge in the 
processes.  
B.  PART II: WOLF PAC, STILETTO SHIP OPERATION 
The OFT explores and nurtures developing technologies 
that have not been identified as requirements by DoD.  Its 
goal is to produce change within the DoD forces through 
operational experimentation.  One of its major experiments 
is the Wolf PAC operational surrogate, the M80 Stiletto 
ship. The Stiletto is a combat craft initiative designed to 
benefit from densely networked sensor technologies, 
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tactical space assets, unmanned vehicles, and new hull 
forms which take advantage of modularity, speed, and 
complexity to increase lethality and survivability.  
Stiletto’s first operational experiment was a mine 
hunting/mine clearance scenario in conjunction with San 
Diego's Naval Special Clearance Team One based out of Naval 
Amphibious Base, Coronado. This complex experiment 
demonstrated Stiletto's ability to support the mine 
clearance personnel as well as seven unique unmanned 
vehicles used to support their mine hunting/mine clearance 
mission.  Additionally, the Stiletto “demonstrates the use 
of surrogates in the experimentation process to rapidly 
acquire, deploy, and employ new capabilities in today's 
uncertain security environment.  It represents a new 
business model which revalues design principles for 
information age operations.”32 
However, because of the experimental nature of this 
OFT research and development (R&D) program, it is difficult 
for the DoD to determine if this program is a proper 
investment option worth risking millions of dollars for R&D 
and possibly procurement.  One of the basic principles of 
the OFT stresses the importance of developing and getting 
the correct metrics and applying them enterprise wide.33  
Ultimately for OFT new concept program, the Stiletto, DoD 
should be able to establish metrics to form a baseline that 
can compare and access the employment of the Stiletto’s 
operational capabilities. This may assist in enabling the 
                     32 Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation, Wolf PAC 
Transformation, Wolf PAC Transforming Defense, Distributed Adaptive 
Operations, p. 5. 
33 Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation, 
<http://www.oft.osd.mil/library/library_files/document_297_MT_StrategyD
oc1.pdf> (accessed September 6, 2006). 
49
determination as to whether this particular OFT program 
conforms to the transformation goals and objectives, enough 
to warrant additional resources.    
Using information taken from SME’s from the Naval 
Surface Warfare community and from the OFT, this proof of 
concept will use the KVA approach for this analysis.  The 
KVA will provide the framework necessary to depict the 
output of sub-process assets as common units of measure.  
The market comparables can then be derived from the 
assessment of equivalent private industry core processes.  
This will allow the comparative revenue estimates to be 
made for the process outputs of DoD service program 
operations, which are non-profit oriented.  KVA methodology 
provides estimates allowing a revenue generated baseline 
construct to be developed for the cost of operational sub-
processes.  This now provides the data needed for cost and 
value assessments, such as ROI.  
1.  Objective 
The overall objective of this research was to develop 
a model and methodology to assist in the evaluation and 
value assessment of the DoD OFT’s Wolf PAC Stiletto 
operations.  For the purposes of the thesis the focus of 
the model will be the evaluation of the Stiletto 
operational mine hunting capability.  Of the Stiletto’s 
many projected operational capabilities, the mine hunting 
exercises were the first and most recently tested for the 
vessel during the period of 08 May 2006 – 12 May of 2006.   
Once value metrics were defined and a baseline created for 
existing mine hunting capabilities and future operational 
capabilities, comparisons could be made and the impact  
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accessed.  Results could be utilized to make judgments 
related to further investment into R&D and also, 
procurement.   
2. Methodology 
This proof of concept obtained information from SMEs 
from the surface warfare community through interviews and 
conversations to be used as the “As-Is” process 
information.  The extracted sub-process input will be 
analyzed to reflect a cost for those sub-processes using 
the KVA method and value estimates. This analysis 
establishes the “As-Is” baseline for the model.  
Application of the KVA methodology will be used to analyze 
whether the Stiletto ship, will enhance the mine hunting 
operational capabilities through the use of its advanced IT 
assets.  Resulting ROK value and cost estimates will 
reflect the impact the introduction of IT has on the 
operational process.  Additionally, analysis can be 
conducted through comparison between the “As-Is” and “To-
Be” models to make determinations regarding ROI.    
3.  Defining the Mine-Hunting Process 
The United States Navy conducts mine hunting 
operations with Coastal Mine Hunter (MHC) ship.   MHC has a 
crew size of 55 personnel.  However, not all crew members 
are directly involved with mine operations when they take 
place.  For the purpose of this thesis, only the billets 
that have a direct impact on the mine hunting are 
identified. 
a.  Operations Officer (OPSO)   
The Operations Officer (OPSO) has the overall 




tactical mine hunting operation missions.  Additional 
duties accomplished by the OPSO outside of mine hunting 
operational duties are not applicable to this thesis. 
b.  Damage Control Assistant (DCA) 
The Damage Controlmen perform the work necessary 
for damage control, ship stability, firefighting and fire 
prevention. They also repair damage control equipment and 
systems.  Additional duties that may be accomplished by the 
OPSO outside of mine hunting operational duties are not 
applicable to this thesis.  
c.  Minemen Chief/Combat Information Center 
(CIC) Officer    
The Minemen chief has the overall responsibility 
as the senior Minemen of the operational performance of all 
Minemen.  He has the additional collateral duty during mine 
hunting operations as the CIC officer.  He will function in 
the mine hunting tactical nerve center, the CIC, of the 
ship as part of the C2 team.  Additional duties that maybe 
accomplished by the OPSO outside of mine hunting 
operational duties are not applicable to this thesis 
d. Minemen  
Minemen have the responsibility aboard the MHC of 
assisting in the detection and neutralization of underwater 
mines.  They handle and operate deck-loaded mine 
neutralization equipment, performing electrical and 
electronic checks and tests of circuitry and components.  
Additional duties that maybe accomplished by the Minemen 
outside of mine hunting operational duties are not 
applicable to this thesis. 
4.  Assumptions  
The following assumptions as they apply to the 
conceptual c2 model, KVA proof of concept.   
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a.  Cost Assumptions 
Cost of active duty military personnel was derived 
from annual DoD military personnel salary for Fiscal Year 
2006 as presented on the Defense Finance and Accounting 
Service.34    
 
MHC total costs per hour based on yearly salaries 
Personnel Rank Yearly Salaries 
1 0-4 $70,000.00 
2 0-3 $110,000.00 
2 0-2 $90,000.00 
1 E-7 $40,200.00 
2 E-6 $68,000.00 
3 E-5 $84,000.00  













Average cost per hour 
 
$11.43 
Table 10.   MHC Total Costs Per Hour 
 
b. Market Comparable Revenue Assumptions 
Similar to the Part I model, surrogate revenues 
in this scenario are based on a market comparable approach.     
For this model, the market comparables were derived by 
obtaining average costs of commercial shipping operations 
similar to that of the Coastal Mine Hunter.  Since there 
are no for profit commercial ships that conduct mine                      34 Defense finance and Accounting Service. “Basic Pay”  
<http://www.dod.mil/dfas/militarypay/newinformation/WebPayTableVersion2
006updated.pdf> [01 January 2006] (accessed August 22, 2006). 
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hunting operations, a direct comparison to the MHC could 
not be made.  However, there are commercial ships that 
specifically operate in coastal waters.  For this model we 
used dredging ships to determine a market comparable per 
job price.  We were able to calculate a per job price by 
averaging the cost of dredging jobs from several different 
dredging corporations.  We then used this calculated amount 
in the same manner as that of the Part I model.  
5.   Defined Mine-Hunting Sub-Processes 
Unlike the previous C2 model in Part I, the sub-
process for the mine hunting operations are not necessarily 
sequential.  However, they are conducted at some point in 
the completion of operational mission.  Some sub-processes 
happen concurrently, respective to one another.  For the 
“As-Is” process to be a viable source for use with KVA 
methodology, the sub-processes were derived from 
descriptions given by SME’s in the MHC ship community.  
Understanding the current “As-Is” sub-process is important 
to be able to understand how IT and or re-engineering the 
process might possibly create a more desirable process.  


















Process Billets Sub-process 
OPERATIONS OFFICER 
Interpreting Intel Reports   
Writes Action Messages 
Plans Operational Actions 
Mine Brief 
Maneuver ship course 
DAMAGE CONTROL ASSISTANT 
Firefighting Team Operations 
 
External Safety Operations 
MINEMEN CHIEF/COMBAT INFO 
OFFICER 
Checking Communication in 
Combat Information Center 
Comparing charts between CIC 
and Bridge 
Provide safety for operations 
MINEMEN 





between the bridge and 
fantail of the ship 
Table 11.   Mine Hunting Sub-Processes. 
 
The sub-processes listed and their associated 
functions are necessary to conduct a mine hunting 
operation.  However, depending on operational circumstances 
some of the sub-processes might not be conducted in every 
mine hunting operation.  For the purposes of this model it 
will be assumed all the sub-processes will be conducted at 
some point during the operation.  Further clarification of 
each sub-process is given is provided below as provided by 
the SME of the MHC community.   
a.  Interpreting Intelligence Reports 
The OPSO deciphers all intelligence reports which 
provide situational awareness for the current mission.  It 
is imperative that the OPSO handles acceptance and response 




Intelligence reports which may be time sensitive are 
essential information in the assessment and planning for 
the mine-hunting operations.     
b.  Writes Actions Messages 
The OPSO develops and communicates all ship 
action messages to higher authorities within the chain of 
command.  Action messages report all ships planned activity 
to be implemented during current operation.  Action 
messages are also developed to report actual activity that 
has occurred during the operation.  Also actions messages 
are developed to report results of the operation after 
mission is completed. 
c.  Plans Operational Actions   
The OPSO develops operational courses of actions 
for the mine hunting mission for the Commanding Officer 
decision.  Course of action developments are based on  
the Commanding Officer’s Intent and current situational 
awareness (i.e., intelligence reports, current area of 
operations). 
d.  Mine Brief 
The OPSO develops a mine brief for the 
operational mission.  The mine brief is developed and 
disseminated to those personnel who are directly involved 
in the mine hunting operation.  The mine brief should 
present a clear common picture of the operational missions, 
functions, and tasks to be accomplished during the 
operation.  The mine brief includes detailed analysis of 
area of operations for the mission. 
e.  Maneuver Ship’s Course    
The OPSO charts and maneuvers the ship’s 
direction and course during the operational mission, within 
the area of operations. 
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f.  Firefighting Team Operations 
The Damage Control personnel do the work 
necessary for damage control, ship stability, fire fighting 
and prevention that may occur in actions associated with 
mine hunting operations.  
g.  External Safety Operations 
The Damage Control personnel perform the external 
safety operation of ensuring mines are pushed away from the 
ship which are discovered and are too close to ship’s 
proximity to destroy. 
h.  Checking Communication in Combat Information 
Center (CIC) 
The Minemen chief performs the collateral duty of 
the CIC officer during mine hunting operations.  He will  
evaluate, disseminate, and process all information that is 
received within the ships tactical CIC during mine hunting 
operations. 
i.  Chart Comparison between the CIC and the 
Bridge    
The Minemen chief monitors, tracks and charts the 
ships planned versus actual maneuvered course relative to 
its area of operations.  He reports all discrepancies to 
the OPSO 
j.  Provide for Safety Operations 
The Minemen chief oversees the safety operations 
which involve back aft equipment deployment and 
redeployment, specifically, the operations involving the 
Mine Neutralization Vehicle and equipment. 
k.  Mine Neutralization Vehicle (MNV) Operation 
Minemen perform all tasks associated with the 
operation and maneuver of the MNV during mine hunting 
operations.   
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l.  Maintenance   
Minemen perform tasks associated with maintenance 
of the MNV and associated equipment (i.e., performing 
electrical and electronic checks and tests of circuitry and 
components of the MNV). 
m.  Deployment and Redeployment 
Minemen perform tasks associated with the 
handling the deployment and redeployment of the deck loaded 
MMV for the mine hunting operations. 
n.  Checking Communication between the Bridge 
and Fantail of the Ship 
Minemen must ensure constant communication is 
maintained between bride and fantail of the ship.  Updated 
reports of fantail operations are reported to the CIC and 
OPSO. 
6. “As Is” KVA Analysis  
An analysis of each sub-process within mine hunting 
operation of the MHC ship is provided in the Table 11.  The 
core processes listed have been defined by the SME in the 
surface warfare community who served tour of duty aboard a 
MHC class ship.  Each category for the KVA analysis is 
defined below. 
a.  Ordinal Ranking 
The “ordinal rank” of the sub-processes was 
assigned by the SME who ranked the sub-processes based on 
complexity. Lower numbers equate to less complexity while 
larger numbers depict more complexity.  The complexity of 
the processes is also indicated by the actual learning time 
(ALT) column where the most complex tasks are presumed to 
take longer to learn.  This ranking is completed 
independently of ALT estimates.  In order to demonstrate 
the reliability of the ranking estimates, a correlation is 
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derived mathematically between ordinal ranking and ALT.  A 
high correlation percentage between these columns is an 
indication that the estimates are accurate when compared to 
the complexity of the sub-processes and the time it takes 
to learn them (ALT). 
b.  Learning Time 
“Learning time” is considered the knowledge 
embedded in a process. It is also considered proportionate 
to the amount of knowledge learned.  The learning time 
category is derived using a common individual as the 
baseline reference point.  Therefore, the SME was 
instructed to provide the estimated time to learn the sub-
process based on the time it would take an average person 
to earn the given process.  Examples of process learning 
for this category include formal schools and distance 
education among others.      
c. On-the-Job Training  
“On-the-Job Training (OJT)” is considered an 
additional part of process learning.  It is considered in 
the determination of the alternate learning time.  Examples 
of OJT include training ship on-board ship, manuals, and 
other informal instruction.  
d.  Alternate Learning Time 
This category is the total amount of learning for 
the total sub-process.  It is the result of learning time 
plus On-the-Training.  
e.  Percentage of IT  
This is a representation of the extent to which 
automation is utilized in the sub-process.  IT is measured 
on a scale from zero percent to 100 percent.  Estimating 
the IT involvement accurately ensures that knowledge which 
is embedded in the IT resources is accounted for within the 
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sub-process.  Also the IT column identifies how information 
technology is used to complete the process, hardware and 
software IT designed and implemented for the purposes of 
enabling the mine-hunting sub-processes. The degree of 
automation in the sub-process is considered the amount of 
activity that is completed by IT resources. 
f.  Total Learning Time  
Total Learning Time represents the amount of 
knowledge embedded in the sub-process.  It is determined by 
multiplying the number of personnel involved in the sub-
process, the number iterations of the sub-process, and the 
SLT.  This result is divided by the percentage of IT 
category, (1-IT%).  The calculation total is the amount of 
sub-process output, by knowledge asset, used in the 
execution of this process. 
g.  Times Fired 
Times fired category represents the number of 
times each sub-process is executed by the specified ship 
personnel. In this process the specific sub-process may 
have multiple occurrences at different points within the 
overall process.  Determination of times fired is an  
estimate from the SME based on his knowledge and experience 
of the actions that are required and taken during a mine-
hunting operation.   
h.  “Number of Persons” 
The “Number of Persons” category represents the 
number of personnel which are involved in the specific sub-
process.  Personnel are assigned to performing duties of 
the sub-process.  The number of participating personnel in 
a sub-process is based upon SME estimates, noting there is 
no standard.    
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i.  Total Knowledge (K) 
Total knowledge represents the amount of 
knowledge embedded in the sub-process.  It is determined by 
multiplying the number of personnel involved in the sub-
process, the number of times fired for the particular sub-
process, and the SLT.  This result is divided by the 
percentage of IT category, (1-IT%).   
j.  Numerator  
The numerator category represents the revenue 
amount allocated based on the percentage of the amount of 
knowledge embedded in each stage in terms of total 
knowledge.  “It can be represented as a percentage of the 
revenue or sales dollar allocated to the amount of 
knowledge required to obtain the outputs of a given process 
in proportion to the total amount of knowledge required to 
generate the corporation's salable outputs.”35 The numerator 
was calculated by multiplying the average fee of the market 
comparable business (hourly rate $54.56) by the number of 
their personnel (20) and by the number of hours to complete  
all sub-process.  The numerator is derived by multiplying 
the learning time allocation factor % by the total revenue 
for each sub-process.     
k.  Denominator 
The denominator represents the costs that are 
used to generate the outputs or expenses of the process. 
The cost in this case, or denominator, is derived from the 
time it takes to complete a sub-process task multiplied by 
the number of people involved per the sub-process 
multiplied by the average cost per hour for completing the  
 
                      35 Housel and Bell, p. 40. 
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work.  Military base pay for selected pay grade across 
staff section was used in order to compute the average cost 
per hour for this analysis.   
l.  Return-On-Knowledge 
Return on Knowledge (ROK) is the ratio between 
the pseudo revenue numerator and the total cost 
denominator.  This ratio allows for comparison of expenses 
and revenues associated with the embedded knowledge assets.  
This ROK will be used to compare efficiency in performance 
within a sub-process and assist in determination of 
relative value.  
m.  “As-Is” Data Analysis 
The format shown in Table 12 displays the core 
process subdivided into sub-processes in order to evaluate 
each sub-process and provide a method to examine its 
relative value.  This was done by placing the focus on the 
determination on the ROK ratios that were produced.  The 
“As-Is” analysis provides a measure of the productivity of 
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The resulting “As-Is” analysis provides the ability to 
access current state of mine hunting operational sub-
processes to future or “To-Be” sub-processes of the Stiletto 
ship.  Comparisons made of the two scenarios assists in 
determining if programs/projects with innovative IT concepts 
are viable solutions for the improvement and are worthy of 
further research and investment.     
7. “To-Be” KVA Analysis 
The “To-Be” analysis is a representation of the future 
sub-processes of mine hunting operations, which reflect the 
capabilities of the new Stiletto ship.  Demonstrated in the 
“To-Be” representation of sub-processes is a reengineered 
process which is affected by the increased utilization of 
the IT assets and automation.  Not all sub-processes will be 
affected in this “To-Be” analysis.  Comparisons will only be 
made for those sub-processes that were modified.  Remaining 
sub-process will remain unchanged.  
a.  Reengineered Process  
The major change from the “As-Is” process to the 
“To-Be” process is the introduction of the Electronic Keel 
technology. “Stiletto”, employs an “electronic keel” that 
combines the processing power of a bank of supercomputers 
with the networking capability coupled to a robust onboard 
communications system that facilitates data-sharing with 
other nodes on internal and external networks.”36 
Ultimately, what this technology provides is the ability to 
continue mission planning as the current operation takes 
place because of the immediacy of the information feedback.  
The robust network capability improves the C2 capability of 
the decision makers at the Stiletto ship level and higher 
levels, by its ability to provide real time information.  
                     36 Department of Defense, Office of Force Transformation, Wolf PAC. 
<www.oft.osd.mil/initiatives/stiletto/TranformationDefense>. (accessed 
01 August 2006). 
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This assists in the elimination of human errors due to 
translation of information.  It also provides increased 
response time by eliminating human feedback and reporting 
function.  In order to account for this added IT knowledge 
increase, the IT percentage output will be reflected in 
several sub-processes and the elimination of personnel 
required to perform certain sub-processes will be 
identified.     
The other major change to the “To-Be process is 
the Unmanned Underwater Vehicle (UUV) which the Stiletto 
ship uses for mine-hunting vice the MMV which the MHC ship 
uses in its mine-hunting operation.  The UUV technology is 
not only used to hunt the mines but it also has the ability 
to locate and  map the mine field and report back the real 
time information to the Stiletto ship in concert with the 
ships electronic keel.  This has great potential to 
positively affect C2, because the IT technology will allow 
for the earlier synthesis, initial planning and follow-on 
planning at increased rates.   
Table 13 depicts the KVA estimates used to 
determine the total ROK for the representative “To-Be” 
model, the Stiletto ship.  Changes that have been made from 
the “As-Is” model are shown in a shaded corresponding cell 
box.  Elimination of any sub-processes due to the overall  
re-engineered process is shown with a shaded area through 
the entire sub-process row.  
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The automation of the sub-processes had the 
greatest effect on ROK.  With the increase in IT in the 
Stiletto ship, sub-processes assigned to the Operations 
Officer were positively affected.  The “interpreting 
intelligence reports” and the “plans operational actions” 
IT percentage were both increased to 50 percent and 60 
percent respectively.  The use of the electronic keel and 
the capability of the UUV allows for the increased IT 
percentages in these sub-processes.  The “writes action 
messages” sub-process is eliminated due the networking and 
communication integration capability of the electronic 
keel.  It also has the ability to produce real-time 
situational awareness for higher, lower, and adjacent 
echelon commands involved in the operation.   
“CIC communication” and “Chart Comparison” are 
now aided even more.  The UUV technology aids in the 
plotting and charting of mines, therefore justifying the 
increase in the IT percentage.  Also the requirement for 
the “number of personnel” to perform these particular sub-
processes has been reduced.  This is due to the increased 
IT percent usage and the limitation of the ship crew size 
requirement of the Stiletto.  This decrease in personnel 
also results in a decrease in the costs of the specified 
sub-processes.   Additionally, the sub-processes in which 
the size of personnel needed was reduced were those that 
had duties associated with the Damage Control Assessment 
team billets. 
Another change to the core process in this model 
is the Minemen, which the Stiletto does not have; sub-
process actions are similarly replaced by the operational  
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Seal Teams who provide all operational support the UUV.  
The UUV added technological capabilities, is represented as 
an increase in the IT percentage for the sub-process.   
8. Comparative Analysis and ROK 
The comparative analysis Table 13 gives a side-by-side 
comparison of the ROK percentage.  The information 
displayed in bold gives the changes in ROK percentage for 
those sub-processes which were altered in order to 
represent Stiletto operational sub-processes.  The addition 
of Stiletto IT automation, introduced into the respective 
sub-process, had major impacts on the mine hunting 
operation analysis.   
Comparative Analysis 
Sub-processes As IS ROK 
(Revenue/Expense) 




























Sub-processes As IS ROK 
(Revenue/Expense) 


























fantail of the 
ship 
6% 4% 
TOTAL 346% 484% 
Table 14.   Comparative Analysis. 
 
ROK displayed for both the “As-Is” and “To-Be” shows 
the knowledge assets that are embedded in these represented 
scenarios.  The ROK results indicated that there will be 
significant value that can be found in both ship’s mine 
hunting operations sub-processes, which can be similarly 
evaluated and assessed.  The knowledge-value ROK total 
increase for the re-engineered process of the Stiletto ship 
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operations is depicted in Table 13.  Overall, total ROK 
value is significantly greater for the “To-Be” process.  
However, it is noted in this model that even though the 
total ROK value for the “To-Be” process increased over that 
of the “As-Is” process, not all sub-processes increased 
respectively.  The major factor contributing to these 
decreases can be attributed to the reduction in personnel 
manning allowed for by the Stiletto.  Personnel are 
considered part of the knowledge assets within a sub-
process.  With a reduction in the Stiletto ship board 
personnel billets, this ultimately decreases the knowledge 
the assets within the sub-process.   
This model demonstrates the Stiletto capabilities have 
great potential in increasing operational value with 
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V.  CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
With the DoD acquisition of programs and projects 
becoming increasingly expensive, it is important that the 
method or measure for determining value for a particular 
project, real or conceptual, be identified and used 
enterprise-wide.  Shrinking DoD budgets prompt a move away 
from investing in programs simply because they represent 
the “new technology” of the day.  Instead the DoD should 
rely on trusted evaluation methods and techniques to value 
its programs and projects.  The KVA methodology shows 
promise to be one such tested methodology based on its use 
by hundreds of companies in which the resulting outcomes 
led many to revisit the way they view and run their 
corporations.  
The possible uses of Knowledge Value Added (KVA) as a 
methodology to evaluate the OFT Wolf-PAC / Stiletto program 
concepts and surrogates programs is promising.  It shows 
promise because of the potential of this methodology to be 
used throughout the DoD to make relevant and measurable 
evaluations of other DoD projects and programs that were 
formerly improperly evaluated or not evaluated at all.  
Using the KVA methodology for assessment of the OFT’s Wolf 
PAC program, this thesis explored two distinctly different 
areas to demonstrate KVA’s use and benefit.  This thesis 
approached the following subject under the Wolf PAC 
purview:  Part (1) used the KVA method to find the 
improvements in a notional C2 process and Part (2) showed 
the increase value of the Stiletto ship in littoral 
operations, more specifically mine hunting.  As in the  
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private sector where the use of KVA generated the outcomes 
which in turn led to the revisiting of corporate 
methodologies, KVA promises similar rewards for DoD.   
This thesis displayed the operational value in both 
proof of concept scenarios.  Value determination in the 
form of ROK provided informative insight to operational 
processes of both scenarios.  The proof of concept scenario 
in Part I showed the ability of KVA to be used with a 
conceptual program model.  The evaluation of the C2 
conceptual program model demonstrated that with the 
meaningful metrics the KVA method provided, relevant 
measures of effectiveness.  As a result value could be 
determined.  These research findings are consistent with 
other studies done the on the application of this 
methodology.    
No measurement methodology, however useful, can 
replace the creative insights, judgment and 
intuition of managers and investors. KVA is no 
exception to this rule and is best used as a 
decision support tool.37 
Based on an acceptance of the above statement, it 
should be the goal of an organization to disseminate the 
KVA methodology in order to “establish a common framework 
within the DoD for understanding, evaluating, and in the 
end justifying the impact of government investments”38 into 
existing as well future projects and programs.   
A.  RECOMMENDATIONS TO THE NAVY 
With the rapid changes in technology and with such a 
vision and emphasis of a total networked military force, it 
                     37 T. Housel and A. Bell, Measuring and Managing Knowledge. Boston: 
McGraw_Hill, 2001. p. 106. 
38 Rios, Cesaer, ROI Analysis of Information Warfare System. Naval 
Postgraduate School, Monterey, CA, 2005. p. 46. 
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is necessary to continue the development of the Wolf-
PAC/Stiletto concept. It would greatly benefit the Navy to 
fully exploit the technology that this vessel could offer 
to the fleet. The full capabilities of this craft have yet 
to be exploited. The KVA analysis has shown a noticeable  
increase in the ROK percentage to the overall process 
designed from the C2 as well as an increasing overall 
process in the mine hunting operations of the Stiletto.  
This craft embodies several capabilities:   
• The ability to adapt to different mission areas 
and the capability to tailor its payload based on 
the assigned task.   
• An improvement in performance and greater cargo 
space based on the lighter nature of carbon-fiber 
construction than of a steel equivalent.   
• New hull form leaves no bow wake. It “eats” or 
consumes its own wake, and combined with the 
hydrodynamic lift, this allows it to cushion 
itself at high speeds.39  
• A fully networked combat electronics suite which 
allows the process of information in a more rapid 
matter.    
It was the goal of this research to provide the means 
to measure value through the use of the Housel/Kanevsky KVA 
methodology and to explore a potentially suitable 
methodology to reflect the ROI return on investment within 
some DoD programs and projects.  The KVA methodology is a 
proven analytical tool that can provide insight and assess 
value into areas or processes of a project/program that may 
not have been previously explored within an organization.  
The findings of this research should be helpful in the 
austere funding environments the DoD potentially faces in 
                     39 Stiletto Cuts a Swath to New Navy Technologies, Robert K. Ackerman 
March 2006. <http://www.afcea.org/signal/articles/anviewer.asp> 
accessed August 30, 2006).  
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the future, when it will be necessary to ensure that tested 
measurable approaches are utilized in the determination of 
the ROI of programs within the DoD.   
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